The Policy That Created the Problem It’s Now Investigating
There is something quietly surreal about watching an inquiry into illicit tobacco unfold in Australia (AGAIN).
Not because illicit trade is new. It isn’t. Every country deals with some level of it. But because of the timing, the tone, and the careful framing of the problem now being examined.
On the surface, it is entirely reasonable. An inquiry into illegal tobacco markets. Concerns about organised crime. Questions about lost tax revenue, enforcement gaps, and the growing visibility of black market supply.
All of it sounds responsible. Necessary, even.
But there is a question sitting just beneath the surface that rarely gets asked directly.
What changed?
Because not long ago, this wasn’t the defining issue. Illicit tobacco existed, yes, but it wasn’t dominating headlines, shaping policy debates, or triggering high-level inquiries. It wasn’t framed as a rapidly expanding crisis requiring urgent national attention.
Now it is.
And something happened in between.
Over the past decade, tobacco policy in Australia has moved in one clear direction. Higher taxes, tighter controls, reduced access, stronger deterrence. Each step was justified on public health grounds. Reduce consumption. Discourage uptake. Protect the population.
Individually, each measure made sense within that framework.
Collectively, they reshaped the entire market.
Legal tobacco became increasingly expensive. In some cases, prohibitively so. The gap between regulated products and what people were willing or able to pay widened. Access tightened. Alternatives were restricted or removed from the legal pathway.
And as that gap widened, something else expanded to fill it.
Not through policy. Through behaviour.
People don’t disappear when a product becomes harder to access. They adjust. They look for substitutes. They follow the path that remains available to them, not the one that was closed off.
This is where the story shifts, though not in a way that is openly acknowledged.
Because the illicit market that is now under investigation did not emerge in isolation. It grew in parallel with the pressures being applied to the legal one. It responded to incentives, just as any market does.
Higher prices created an opportunity. Restricted access created demand. Reduced legal pathways increased the value of illegal ones.
None of this required coordination. It didn’t need to be planned. It is simply how systems respond when constraints are applied unevenly.
And now, here we are.
An inquiry into illicit tobacco.
Hear the language around it. It focuses on criminal networks, supply chains, enforcement challenges, and regulatory gaps. It asks how the market operates, how widespread it has become, and how it can be disrupted.
All important questions.
But they exist within a frame that treats the illicit market as an external problem, rather than an internal outcome.
Because to widen that frame, even slightly, would introduce a more difficult line of inquiry.
Not just how did this happen, but why now?
Why has the illicit market become so attractive? Why has it scaled so visibly? Why are consumers participating in it at levels that now warrant national attention?
Those questions do not sit comfortably within a purely enforcement-focused narrative.
They point back upstream.
Back to the conditions that made the illicit market viable in the first place.
And this is where the silence becomes most noticeable.
Because acknowledging that link does not just complicate the story. It changes responsibility. It shifts the focus from external actors to internal decisions. It raises the possibility that the current situation is not simply a failure of enforcement, but a predictable response to policy settings.
This does not mean the intent of the policy was wrong. The goal of reducing smoking-related harm is clear and widely supported. But intent and outcome are not always aligned, especially in complex systems where people respond dynamically to constraints.
When legal options become too expensive, too restricted, or too difficult to access, behaviour does not simply stop. It shifts.
Sometimes gradually. Sometimes suddenly. But almost always in ways that preserve the underlying demand.
That demand does not disappear. It relocates.
Often into spaces that are harder to see, harder to regulate, and ultimately harder to control.
Which brings us back to the inquiry itself.
There is an inherent tension in a system investigating a problem that may be, at least in part, a product of its own design. Not deliberately. Not maliciously. But structurally.
Because addressing that possibility would require more than enforcement.
It would require reflection.
It would mean examining not just the symptoms of the illicit market, but the environment that allowed it to thrive. It would mean asking whether the balance between restriction and substitution has been misjudged. Whether removing or limiting lower-risk, legal alternatives has had unintended downstream effects.
It would also mean confronting something more uncomfortable.
That tightening a system does not always produce compliance. Sometimes it produces workarounds. Sometimes it produces parallel systems that operate outside the very controls designed to prevent them.
And once those systems establish themselves, they are not easily undone.
They become embedded. Normalised. Sustained by both supply and demand.
Which raises an even more difficult question.
Is the current approach containing the problem or displacing it?
These are not easy questions.
They cut across established narratives. They challenge assumptions that have guided policy for years. They introduce complexity into what is often presented as a straightforward public health objective.
They also require a willingness to look backward, not just forward.
So instead, the inquiry proceeds along more stable ground.
It investigates the present. It documents the scale of illicit trade. It considers enforcement responses. It looks for ways to tighten the system further, to close gaps, to regain control.
All of which may have some effect.
But without stepping back to examine the broader sequence, the cause, the intervention, the adaptation, the consequence, it risks treating the outcome as if it appeared independently of the conditions that produced it.
And that is the quiet paradox at the centre of it all.
A system attempting to solve a problem, while remaining just far enough away from how it came to be.
Not hidden. Not denied.
Just left out of the frame. For now.


Since all these enquiries, hearings....keep relying on the same "experts" for over 10 years, we will have same outcomes, nothing will change.
There have been numerous recent official inquiries into Australia’s failed cigarette/tobacco/vape policy. All have ended up backing the status quo. But the criticism of these policies is increasing and these days is much more often reported by mainstream media than it used to be. It’s also becoming more obvious that safer, smoke-free nicotine products are rapidly replacing deadly cigarettes. Consumers prefer safer, smoke-free nicotine products and major traded tobacco companies are also switching as fast as they can. The faster a tobacco company is switching, the higher its share price. This suggests that people who buy tobacco company shares prefer to buy share of companies switching faster than companies switching slowly. It’s generally a struggle getting new drug harm reduction interventions to be accepted by governments. But once accepted, they are usually increasingly deployed and become increasingly popular. So most new drug harm reduction interventions get there in the end. Safer, smoke-free nicotine products are also what business people call “disruptive Innovations” and these also generally get accepted. Think of smartphones replacing Nokia or Blackberry phones which in turn replaced landline phones. Think of electric trains replacing diesel which replaced coal trains. Think of streaming replacing CDs which replaced Walkmans which replaced vinyl records. Australia is deeply entrenched in nicotine technology that is obsolete.